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HELL, HANDBASKETS, AND
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE DUTY
OF LOYALTY AND ITS LIMITS
MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN*
I
INTRODUCTION: HOW I KILLED TWELVE MILLION PEOPLE
I am responsible—indirectly, remotely, only contributorily, and perhaps ex-
cusably, but nonetheless partially responsible—for the deaths of one and a half
million innocent unborn children per year.  I might have been able to stop the
nomination of David Souter to the United States Supreme Court, and thus pos-
sibly could have prevented the Court’s disastrous reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade1
two years later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 if only I had been willing to
violate my duty of confidentiality as a government lawyer and leak to pro-life
groups my advance knowledge of Souter’s likely nomination to the Supreme
Court by President Bush in 1990.  I had the information.  I had the opportunity.
I had the time.  I had the telephone in hand.  But indecision, inertia, uncer-
tainty—and probably cowardice—prevailed.  I did nothing.
I remain racked with guilt over my inaction.  I alternate between being con-
vinced that I acted in the only ethical, lawful, and honorable manner available
to me as an attorney and government employee, and being convinced I should
have leaked the information, either secretly or openly, in order to avert a much
greater wrong and that my failure to do so was an act of great cowardice and a
miserable failing of moral principle on my part.  Sometimes I feel there must
have been some available middle course that would have lessened the moral
and legal dilemma with which I was confronted.  Other times, I excuse myself
on the ground that I could not have known for sure how things would play out
in the end.
But two points are clear to me:  First, my moral responsibility for my own
conduct as a government lawyer (and as a human being) is not lessened by the
complicity or superior power of others, or by doubts about whether the chain of
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causation would in fact have been altered even if I had acted.  Second, in the
eyes of the law, I acted properly.
Fast forward eight years to a seemingly unrelated series of events today, in
1998.  Government lawyers, both within the Justice Department and the White
House, almost certainly can be assumed to have known of President Clinton’s
(and perhaps others’) involvement in serious federal crimes while in office.3
Yet, at the time of this writing,4 apparently none has (yet) seen fit to come for-
ward to the proper government officials or the public with this knowledge.  If
these lawyers do indeed possess such knowledge, they are responsible—
indirectly, remotely, and only contributorily, but nonetheless partially respon-
sible—and inexcusably so, for very serious violations of federal law involving
the corruption of the legal process.
If any government lawyer has been racked with guilt over this situation, we
do not (yet) know of it.  No government lawyer has publicly resigned from con-
tinued representation of the Clinton Administration in a manner that with-
draws or disaffirms his or her prior legal work on behalf of Administration offi-
cials related to matters under investigation by Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr, and with respect to which the President of the United States has admitted
to, at minimum, duplicity.  Yet the course legally required of the government
lawyer is clear:  He or she must discontinue any representation that implicates
the lawyer in an ongoing crime or fraud by a governmental official, must take
necessary steps to rectify the fraud (including disclosure), and must at all events
disclose the unlawful conduct at least to the appropriate, not-involved officials
empowered to act on behalf of the United States government concerning such
matters (the Attorney General or the Independent Counsel with jurisdiction
over the matter).
That no one has done so indicates one of four things, in ascending order of
likelihood: (1) that no law violation has occurred to the knowledge of any gov-
ernment lawyer; (2) that known law violations have occurred to the knowledge
of some Administration lawyers, but they incorrectly believe that their profes-
sional duty is to keep such knowledge confidential; (3) that violations have oc-
curred, but the lawyers with knowledge of the violations perceive that they
have a moral obligation to cover up or not disclose such information, and that
                                                          
3. It is possible that government lawyers, in the White House and in the Department of Justice,
were systematically deceived by the President and other high Administration officials.  This possibility
is addressed below.  See infra text accompanying note 32.  It nonetheless remains likely that, sometime
between mid-January and mid-August 1998, at least some Administration lawyers had acquired actual
knowledge of probable illegal conduct by Clinton Administration officials, and that is the premise on
which I proceed.
4. As this article goes to press (November 1998), the situation remains fluid.  For the most part, I
will discuss the conduct of Clinton Administration lawyers from January 1998 to August 1998, with
specific reference to the probability that President Clinton and others may have engaged in obstruction
of justice in connection with Clinton’s testimony and the testimony of others in the Paula Jones sexual
harassment civil lawsuit.  See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Advisors Map out Defense in Lewinsky Matter,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at A14.  Accordingly, though I will for the most part use the past tense in
describing these events, I recognize that they may have an ongoing character that may sometimes cre-
ate awkwardness in my presentation.
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that moral duty trumps their clear legal obligation; or (4) that some govern-
ment lawyers with such knowledge are simply paralyzed by cowardice, uncer-
tainty, moral confusion, personal loyalties, and self-interest concerning whether
and how to act in accordance with their legal and ethical obligations.
This essay is a tale of two cases of divided loyalties.  It is an essay, partly
autobiographical (the Souter appointment) and partly conjectural (the Clinton
situation), about personal and professional dilemmas for government lawyers,
and what the law has to say about how those dilemmas are supposed to be re-
solved.  It is an essay on the government lawyer’s ethical duty of loyalty and its
limits.
Part II tells the story of the “Souter Scenario.”  Part III tells the unfinished
story of current government lawyers’ possible complicity in, or assistance in,
criminal misconduct by President Clinton and others.  The two stories frame
two equal and opposite questions:  Is it ever proper for an executive branch
government lawyer to sabotage or undermine the lawful policies or decisions of
the administration in which he or she serves?  Is it ever proper for an executive
branch lawyer to acquiesce in the unlawful actions of government officials?
II
THE SOUTER SCENARIO: LOYALTY TO LAWFUL (BUT AWFUL)
ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS
A.  The Law
The ethics rules of the legal profession (to say nothing of federal statutes
and regulations that carry criminal penalties for their violation) plainly require
an executive branch attorney to abide by, indeed to carry out and further, the
policy choices of the legitimately elected administration in which he or she
serves, no matter how strongly the attorney disagrees with those policy choices,
as long as those choices lie within the bounds of the law.  The lawyer may re-
sign, ask to be reassigned, or ask to be relieved of responsibility for a matter
when he finds his governmental client’s objectives “repugnant.”5  But the gov-
ernment lawyer may not engage in internal obstructionism or, worse, external
disloyalty, by disclosing confidential information.  Only if government officials
are engaged in illegal conduct, breaching their fiduciary duties to the United
States, may the lawyer disclose otherwise confidential information.  Otherwise,
the duty of loyalty lies to the incumbent administration’s policies and purposes.
As a friend of mine once said, when I asked how he could serve as a lawyer for
an administration whose (lawful) objectives he so totally despised, “they want
to take the country to hell in a handbasket and it’s my job to help them get
there.”
                                                          
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983) (“[A] lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect
on the interests of the client, or if . . . the client insists upon pursuing an objective the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent . . .”).
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By the same token, the ethics rules of the legal profession (to say nothing of
federal statutes concerning obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and aiding and
abetting substantive offenses) plainly require executive branch lawyers to re-
frain from providing substantial assistance to known unlawful conduct by gov-
ernment officials, no matter how much the government lawyer respects and
supports the policies or conduct of the government officials whom he or she
serves.  Such forbidden assistance to illegality can come in the form of the law-
yer’s silence where the law imposes a duty to speak.6  Thus, for example, if the
President or other executive branch official has, to the knowledge of an execu-
tive branch lawyer, engaged in (or is continuing to engage in) unlawful conduct
in violation of a duty under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the
lawyer must, both as a matter of federal statutory law and traditional ethics
rules, disclose such otherwise confidential information to the appropriate offi-
cer or official of the U.S. government, to the extent necessary to rectify the
violation of law.7  Usually, that step will be sufficient to discharge the lawyer’s
ethical duties, but, in some circumstances, he or she may need to disclose such
information to persons outside the Executive Branch.
In either case, the government lawyer must not in any way counsel or assist
the President or other officer in the commission of the unlawful act.  The gov-
ernment lawyer’s duty of loyalty is to the U.S. government as an entity, acting
lawfully through its lawfully elected and appointed executive officials, and not
to any governmental official personally, not even the President.8  When the
unlawful actions of a governmental official constitute a clear violation of a duty
to the United States, a lawyer for the United States is ethically bound to pursue
the interests of the U.S. government in thwarting and punishing such unlawful
conduct, not the interests of the governmental official who has placed himself
or herself at odds with the laws of the United States.
                                                          
6. See id. Rule 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. . . .”); see also id. Rule 1.2(e) (“When a lawyer knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer’s conduct.”).  The
standard formula for when a lawyer has engaged in forbidden “assistance” of a client’s criminal or
fraudulent conduct is (1) the existence of an underlying violation of law (2) of which the lawyer has
“knowledge” (meaning actual knowledge, but such knowledge may be inferred from the circum-
stances) (3) for which the lawyer has provided substantial assistance (which may include otherwise
“ordinary lawyering” activities, when done with knowledge of the underlying substantive offense
which such lawyering activities assist).  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in As-
sisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 682-83 (1981); see also infra
note 32 (collecting cases).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 34-37; cf. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).
8. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1998):
[Government attorneys’] duty is not to defend clients against criminal charges and it is not to
protect wrongdoers from public exposure.  The constitutional responsibility of the President,
and all members of the Executive Branch, is to ‘to take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. . . .’  Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government lawyer therefore can-
not and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.
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B.  The Situation
The Souter scenario clearly fell into the first category.  President Bush’s
nomination of David Souter clearly involved no violation of the law.  It was his
legitimate policy choice as President whom to appoint to the Court.
Allow me to set the scene.  I was a young attorney in the Office of Legal
Counsel (“OLC”) in the Department of Justice in the first two years of the
Bush Administration (1989-91).  One of OLC’s tasks in those years was to con-
duct background research and draft memoranda on the opinions and apparent
judicial philosophies of a fairly large number of potential candidates for U.S.
Supreme Court appointments, most of whom were judges in the lower federal
and state courts.  These were low-priority, “fun” research assignments, com-
pared to some of the intense, high-profile, time-sensitive research projects or
the other, more tedious work.  It was heady stuff to prepare a twenty- to sixty-
page memorandum that could form the basis for whether a particular candidate
became a Supreme Court nominee.9
On July 21, 1990, the morning after William Brennan announced his retire-
ment late on a Friday evening, OLC, along with the White House Counsel’s of-
fice, sprang into high gear.  New memoranda were prepared for new candi-
dates.  Existing memoranda were quickly updated.  Shorter, leaner memoranda
summarizing the views and major opinions of the leading ten to fifteen candi-
dates were prepared quickly, nearly a dozen OLC lawyers working continu-
ously from Saturday morning until 2:00 a.m. Sunday, so that the packet of short
memoranda could be given to President Bush to read at Camp David on Sun-
day.
By late Sunday morning, many of us were back in the office again, handling
further research tasks on the prospective nominee front.  By that time, it was
becoming clear which candidates were the most serious contenders.  Every
opinion certain judges had written was reviewed with a fine-tooth comb.  The
“Final Four” began to take shape, and two were clearly the most likely candi-
dates.  One could tell this from who was being assigned to do the fine-tooth
combing and how many bodies were being thrown at the task.  The leading two
contenders, as press accounts shortly after the nomination accurately reflected,
were Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit and Judge David Souter of the First
Circuit, a relative unknown who had spent most of his judicial career in the
New Hampshire state courts and had been on the federal bench for only a very
few months.10
                                                          
9. I have considered carefully whether any of the facts stated in the narrative that follows are
covered by an ongoing duty of confidentiality to my former client, and have concluded that they are
not.  Everything stated here, other than my personal thoughts and emotions, was publicly reported at
the time or has been subsequently reported in the press.  It would belabor the presentation unduly to
provide an elaborate footnote apparatus in support of the points that are matters of public record or
public report, and I accordingly do not do so here.
10. Press reports immediately after the Souter appointment identify the two other key finalists as
Judge Laurence Silberman and Judge Clarence Thomas, both of the D.C. Circuit.  See Ann Devroy, In
the End, Souter Fit Politically, WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at A1.  The press reports state that Presi-
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The office scuttlebutt among some OLC line attorneys on Saturday had
been that Souter was probably being “worked up” as a kind of political obliga-
tion to certain constituencies within and without the Administration—Chief of
Staff John Sununu (New Hampshire’s former Governor) and Senator Warren
Rudman (who had once been Souter’s boss and predecessor as Attorney Gen-
eral of New Hampshire)—and that Souter was not really a serious candidate.
(There were a few other “candidates” who seemed to be of this type.  “What?
Are they seriously considering him?”  “Probably not, but somebody important
either mentioned the name and we have to look like we gave it serious consid-
eration, or there’s some other political reason to be able to say that this person
was on the ‘short list.’”)
By Sunday, however, Souter was obviously a serious contender.  Several of
us recognized that there was a very real danger—danger—that Souter could be
nominated.  From the perspective of those of us line lawyers who favored a
tried-and-true judicial conservative, there were warning signs that Souter would
not be what we called “solid,” but might well turn out to be “squishy” or, far
worse, might “grow in the job” (a humorous euphemism for drifting leftward,
in response to media, legal academic, and Washington-hothouse pressures and
stroking; such “growth,” we thought, was more likely with persons who had
never worked in the Washington milieu, whose judicial philosophy was not al-
ready clearly defined, who appeared to have less strongly defined personal
characters, or who might have pretensions about their place in history).
We were concerned with Souter’s general lack of a clear conservative judi-
cial philosophy, after numerous years and numerous cases decided as a New
Hampshire Supreme Court Justice.  We were concerned that what judicial
philosophy appeared was one of a reasonably smart, but plodding, careful,
precedentialist or incrementalist, who lacked any particular vision or any cri-
tique of Warren Court-era judicial activism.
Particularly troubling were two noteworthy New Hampshire Supreme
Court cases, significant in part because there were so few good indications of
Souter’s judicial philosophy.  First, there was the opinion we dubbed “Kiddie
Miranda,” in which Souter had joined a (mildly) activist interpretation of the
New Hampshire Constitution in creating expanded Miranda warnings in juve-
                                                          
dent Bush and his advisers thought that Clarence Thomas, who had just been confirmed to the D.C.
Circuit, should get some time to “‘settle in, to get some experience.’”  Id. (quoting “two senior offi-
cials”).  (Curiously, Souter had just recently been confirmed to the First Circuit, but no similar point is
reported to have been raised in the discussions.)  Reportedly, President Bush struck Judge Silberman’s
name from the list without explanation.  Press reports noted that Silberman had very recently—within
a matter of days—joined the opinion of the D.C. Circuit (written by Judge David Sentelle) overturning
Oliver North’s conviction.  At the time, an Independent Counsel investigation of Iran-Contra was still
very much in high gear.  Press reports seemed to suggest that this might have been a factor in Bush’s
decision to strike Silberman.  To the extent press reports cite Administration officials’ desires to avoid
controversy with the appointment as a reason for Bush’s ultimate choice of Souter over Jones, this may
well have been a factor in the decision to strike Silberman from consideration.  It is publicly known
(and was mentioned in press speculation at the time) that many conservative lawyers in the Bush Ad-
ministration regarded Silberman as an outstanding candidate—perhaps the best of the names being
discussed—but that Jones was equally conservative and likely to be more politically defensible.
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nile matters.11  Miranda,12 of course, was an extremely activist, policy-becomes-
law opinion, one of the icons of the Warren Court and an exemplar of Warren-
era judicial liberalism.  Many judicial conservatives had criticized Miranda se-
verely.13  For a lower court judge to follow Miranda could of course be con-
strued as “conservative” or “restrained” in the sense of following the course of
precedent marked out by superior courts in the appellate hierarchy.  But ex-
tending Miranda an additional step, in a quasi-legislative manner as a matter of
tendentious interpretation of state law (and in a manner clearly not compelled
by the federal constitution), was truly eyebrow-raising.
But even worse was Smith v. Cote.14  In that case decided in 1986, Souter
joined the opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court creating a new tort
cause of action—thus making new law—for “wrongful birth,” but declining to
create an additional cause of action for “wrongful life.” Wrongful birth is a
cause of action in favor of parents, against doctors, for damages for the eco-
nomic and emotional injury suffered by parents as a consequence of their
child’s being born, where the parents assert that, had the doctor not been negli-
gent in failing to diagnose and advise the parents of their unborn child’s dis-
ability (in Smith v. Cote, heart disabilities, hearing impairment, cataracts, and
motor retardation, resulting from the mother’s rubella), the parents would have
terminated their child’s life by “obtain[ing] a eugenic abortion,” and thereby
would have avoided having to pay for medical and child-rearing costs.15  The
negligence theory was that the doctor, by failing to test for and advise the par-
ents about possible birth defects resulting from exposure of the unborn child to
rubella, deprived the mother “of the knowledge necessary to an informed deci-
sion as to whether to give birth to a potentially impaired child.”16
The “wrongful birth” tort theory is obviously controversial and obviously
untraditional.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court, while not alone in recog-
nizing the theory, was unquestionably engaged in judicial lawmaking, through
explication of what it understood to be New Hampshire common law.  Though
the opinion asserted that the New Hampshire court’s outcome was required by
Roe v. Wade and that that decision had “resolved” the abortion controversy
and was “controlling” on the issue before the New Hampshire court,17 in no
sense was such an assertion even plausibly defensible.  Roe, which remained
sharply contested in 1986, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court had just
barely reaffirmed it in the Thornburgh case, by a vote of five to four,18 held that
                                                          
11. See State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See, e.g., Joseph G. Grano, The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 395, 400 (1989) (discussing conservative criticisms of Miranda); Edwin Meese, III, Square
Miranda Rights with Reason, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1986, at A23.
14. 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
15. Id. at 343.
16. Id. at 355.
17. See id. at 344, 346.
18. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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government could not prohibit abortions; Roe in no way required state tort law
to provide a cause of action for negligence against doctors—private parties—
who are asserted to have breached a “duty of care” to assure that pregnant
women under their care be provided with information that might support a de-
cision to have a “eugenic abortion.”  Indeed, at that time, the law of abortion
was clear that states were not constitutionally obliged to provide financial sup-
port for the abortion choice.19  To find that state tort law required a remedy for
“wrongful birth” was thus a huge extension beyond what the federal constitu-
tional law of abortion has ever required.
Souter did not write the opinion for the majority, but he did join it.  What is
more, his decision to join was considered and reflective.  In what apparently
was intended as a moderating caveat, Souter wrote separately in Smith v. Cote
to note his opinion that a doctor conscientiously opposed to abortion should be
able to discharge the new tort duty by referring the parents to physicians who
would have no moral qualms about testing for birth defects with an eye toward
recommending abortion; the conscientiously opposed doctor need not do any
of this himself or herself.  For Souter, the new tort duty might be satisfied by
warning the woman of the doctor’s conscientious scruples concerning eugenic
abortion and by referring the woman to a doctor who would have none.20
Some conservatives (and some Souter opponents) took Souter’s concur-
rence as a signal of anti-Roe sympathies, but such a reading was obviously
strained.  Souter concurred in the creation of the new cause of action.  Moreo-
ver, almost as revealing as what Souter’s concurrence said was what it did not
say.  Souter chose to take issue with this one point not raised by the questions
certified to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  He did not take issue with
anything else in the rather Orwellian opinion of the Court.  And what Souter
did say was almost ridiculously naïve:  Only a person thoroughly unfamiliar
with the thinking of those who oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds
would think that a physician holding such views would be relieved by the find-
ing that the new duty might—might!—be discharged by fulfillment of a duty to
disclose such views to patients as an expression of the “limits” of his or her pro-
fessionalism plus a duty to refer the patient to a physician who lacked such
scruples.21
                                                          
19. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
20. Souter wrote:
It does not follow, however, and I do not understand the court to hold, that a physician can
discharge the obligation of due care in such circumstances only by personally ordering such
tests and rendering such advice.  The court does not hold that some or all physicians must
make a choice between rendering services that they morally condemn and leaving their pro-
fession in order to escape malpractice exposure.  The defensive significance, for example, of
timely disclosure of professional limits based on religious or moral scruples, combined with
timely referral to other physicians who are not so constrained, is a question open for consid-
eration in any case in which it may be raised.
Smith, 513 A.2d at 355 (Souter, J., concurring).
21. One common criticism of Souter’s nomination at the time made was that he was something of
an “intellectual hermit”—an unmarried man with no children, little broad life experience, few social
ties, and no professional life outside of New Hampshire.  See, e.g., Ruth Marcus & Joe Pichirallo,
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In short, although Souter was shortly thereafter dubbed the “stealth candi-
date”—chiefly by those fearful that he might prove a staunch conservative and
vote to overrule Roe—Smith v. Cote was a “smoking gun” that revealed, for all
with eyes to see, that David Souter was likely to be a vote to uphold Roe, with
mild reservations at best.  Souter clearly was not “pro-life” in his personal or
jurisprudential outlook.  Nor was he apparently opposed to judicial activism or
judicial lawmaking in principle.  He was, rather, a devotee first and foremost of
precedent and the common law method, willing to follow precedent not only in
controlling specific holdings, but also in pointing the direction for future exten-
sions and expansions of judge-made law (even in constitutional law fields).  His
judicial philosophy was, fairly obviously, that of a go-with-the-flow moderate,
incrementalist, status quo judge—“conservative” only in the most generous
sense of the term.
All of this was known within the Justice Department and the White House
by late Sunday afternoon, July 22, 1990.  Press reports accurately recounted
that Judges Jones and Souter were being flown into town late that afternoon, as
the two finalists who would meet with President Bush the next day.  Although I
did not know that Jones and Souter were on their way or just how quickly
Bush’s decision would come, I did know that they were the two leading final-
ists, that President Bush had publicly expressed his desire to move very quickly,
and that I had worked fourteen hours on Saturday and five on Sunday on the
appointments decision (and I was scarcely the lead dog on the issue—the can-
didates whom I was charged with researching, and whose names confidentiality
still prohibits me from disclosing, were distant also-rans by Sunday afternoon).
It was clear the nomination would come very soon.
I went home around 5:00 p.m. on Sunday.  There was nothing much more to
do.  The decision would be made by the White House.  If need be, we would re-
ceive further marching orders on Monday, but the sense was that there would
not be the need.  President Bush would pick one of the persons we had already
researched, most likely Jones or Souter.
I was deeply distressed by the prospect of Souter, both because I believed
his judicial philosophy was too weakly “conservative,” and, more particularly,
because I believed he was quite likely to vote to uphold Roe—a case I person-
ally found morally and jurisprudentially criminal.  I began to consider leaking
his name to friends of mine in pro-life legal circles, or to a prominent conserva-
tive columnist who attended the same church as I.  I called long-distance infor-
mation seeking the home number of a friend in the Chicago area whom I be-
lieved would be able to galvanize the pro-life forces on short notice, but he had
recently moved and I could not find the right suburb.
                                                          
Seeking Out the Essential David Souter; Bookish, Insular Justice-Designate to Face Senate Panel This
Week, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1990, at A1 (“The insular nature of Souter’s life in New Hampshire, and
the narrowness of his life experiences, have prompted some observers to question whether the little-
known judge has the range of human understanding necessary for a justice.”).  The Smith v. Cote con-
currence is certainly Exhibit A in support of such a view of Souter.
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All the while, I was agonizing over whether to make the call even if I got
the number:  Souter’s name had been mentioned in at least one press report, so,
in a sense, I would just be kibitzing with a friend about one of the possible
names.  But I did have inside information, the purpose of the call would be to
convey it (whether directly or subtly), and it was clear that my client, the Ex-
ecutive Branch of the U.S. government (acting through the President and his
subordinates, acting lawfully and within the scope of their powers), intended
the information to remain confidential so President Bush could make the
choice before issue-group pressures could be brought to bear (which would
have been precisely what my call would be designed to thwart).  To reveal the
information would have been a violation of my duties as a lawyer and as a gov-
ernment employee.  It might even have been a crime.  (I did not wish to consult
anyone else in my office about this last aspect, or about the decision generally,
for I would then have implicated them in my conduct.)
At the same time, I was uncertain about “causation.”  The President might
well choose Jones, and, even if Souter were chosen, one could not be certain he
would be terrible.  The Supreme Court might overrule Roe in any event.
(Webster22 had just been decided, and there appeared already to be a slender
majority to distinguish Roe into oblivion.)  And, after all, it was the President’s
decision to make, not mine.  Who was I to substitute my judgment for that of
older, more seasoned hands, who knew Souter personally, who had interviewed
him for the Court of Appeals appointment, and who also had read his opin-
ions?
I did nothing.  Souter’s nomination was announced the next afternoon,
Monday, July 23, 1990.  Just as Bush’s press conference announcing Souter was
about to begin, I received a phone call from my friend in Chicago.  He wanted
to chat about the nomination.  I told him what was going to be secret for only
about another forty-five seconds.
“What?!” he said.  “Souter?!  He’s got a wrongful birth opinion!”  We cut
the conversation short.  I walked down to the OLC conference room as the
television announcement was starting, but after a few seconds, I could not
watch any more.  Depressed and bitterly angry with myself, yet still conflicted, I
left the office for the day.  I felt I probably should have leaked the information.
Shortly after the nomination had been announced, I ended up speaking
again with my friend in Chicago.  Pro-life leaders had met with Chief of Staff
Sununu and others at the White House.  He shared my dissatisfaction with
Souter.  I suggested that the pro-life groups should “go nuclear” against Souter.
He said that the refrain from the White House was, as he put it, “trust and
obey.”  The pro-life groups had been reassured that the White House thought
Souter would be just fine.  Smith v. Cote signaled Souter’s sensitivity to the pro-
life stance.  The pro-life groups were skeptical, but felt they had few options.
They did not wish to oppose a pro-life President or forfeit their influence for
                                                          
22. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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later appointments.  I suggested to my friend that opposing Souter would not
hurt Souter’s confirmation chances, and that the strong opposition of pro-life
groups might both help in Souter’s confirmation (ironically) and help obtain a
more satisfactory nominee for a future vacancy, should one occur.  But this was
a “too little, too late” discussion.  Based on this phone conversation, I took
some solace in the possibility that, even if I had leaked the confidential infor-
mation of Souter’s likely nomination, it would not have stopped the Souter
train from leaving the station.
Did I, through indecision and cowardice—or through an uneasy, almost
unintended, triumph of principle over personal politics—do the right thing by
doing nothing?  With 20/20 hindsight, and in view of the consequences, I be-
lieve I did the wrong thing.  There are few issues about which I believe strongly
enough to violate the duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed by a government
attorney to the administration he or she serves—duties that in themselves have
substantial moral weight.  Abortion is one of those very few issues.  (A gener-
alized lack of comfort with a candidate’s perceived judicial philosophy would
clearly not be sufficient.)  I was personally convinced, largely from my own
reading of the Souter record, that there was a huge risk—indeed, a substantial
likelihood—that Souter would be a complete disaster on what I regard as the
most important, life-and-death issue to confront the legal system in my lifetime.
That should have justified leaking.
My worst fears were fully realized just two years later.  Souter was con-
firmed, sat silently on the Court for a year and a half, and then was instrumen-
tal in the Court’s decision in Casey, reaffirming Roe.23  Souter was co-author,
with Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy (two Justices who had been in the
Webster majority, but shifted or outright changed their positions), of the “Joint
Opinion” reaffirming Roe, largely on grounds of stare decisis and the asserted
need for the Court to preserve public respect for the Court as an institution, by
adhering to “watershed” precedents, even if erroneous.  The Joint Opinion is
vintage, Smith v. Cote-style David Souter: precedent, stare decisis, moderate
substantive due process, and “tradition” projected thirty years further down the
path marked by prior activist decisions.
What if?  Had Bush nominated Edith Jones, I believe the Court would have
overruled Roe, perhaps by as much as 7-2.  Clarence Thomas’s appointment
came the year after Souter’s.  With Jones and Thomas replacing Brennan and
Marshall, there would have been five solid votes to overrule Roe: Rehnquist,
Scalia, White, Jones, and Thomas.24  With those five in place, it is highly un-
                                                          
23. For a short critique of Casey, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 CONST. COMM.
221 (1993) (reviewing ROBERT BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992)).  For a short parody
of Casey, see Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, Casey-Style: The Shocking First
Draft of the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1287 (1994).  For a comprehensive critique of Ca-
sey, see Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme
Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15 (1993).
24. Of course, this is necessarily a bit speculative.  It is not absolutely certain that Jones would
have voted to overrule Roe or would have hacked it to bits (though I think it a good bet).  Moreover,
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likely that Kennedy would have switched sides as he did in Casey.  The five
votes would have shielded him from the political consequences of voting to
overrule (which apparently was important to his thinking), and probably would
have led him to be concerned to justify the Court’s institutional prestige by not
overruling Roe by just a slim margin.25  Justice O’Connor, the lone woman on
the Court when Casey was decided and the object of intense academic, political,
and media pressure to reaffirm Roe, would have been even more shielded.  The
appointment of Edith Jones, another conservative woman, would have been the
scale-tipping event, not O’Connor’s shaky fifth vote.  O’Connor could have
joined a carefully crafted, seven-member majority opinion reaching the oppo-
site result of the one reached in Casey.  After all, Casey did overrule two earlier
abortion cases, sustain much of the Pennsylvania statute, and cut back some-
what on the standard of constitutional protection given to abortion.  The possi-
bility was certainly there that O’Connor would have voted to scrap Roe en-
tirely.  Both Kennedy and O’Connor, somewhat more squeamish, media-
sensitive, and tractable than strong judicial personalities like Justice White or
Justice Scalia (and Judge Jones), would have been buttressed in their previ-
ously expressed views by the presence of strong reinforcements.  Casey would
have gone the other way.
But Souter was never a vote to overrule Roe.  His publicly expressed com-
mitment to having not decided the issue was, I think, genuine.26  Indeed, the
“confirmation conversion” (if any) was that Souter became more committed to
being uncommitted.  The Joint Opinion in Casey is in some sense Souter’s
coming-out statement to the world that he really was not the “stealth candi-
date;” that he really was more committed to “process values” and “craft val-
ues” than to any particular reading of the Constitution, and that he was telling
the truth at his confirmation hearing.
With Souter on the Court rather than Jones, that left either Kennedy or
O’Connor with the role of being the decisive fifth vote, each probably waiting
for the other to commit.  Along came Souter with his attractive approach to
provide the political cover that was lacking because of the lack of safety in
numbers.  The rest is history—probably the historically most important consti-
tutional decision of the Supreme Court in decades.
C.  Moral and Legal Dilemmas
Causation and prediction are always questions of judgment—best guesses
about the future, based on imperfect information.  About the only two proposi-
tions of which I am certain are one of law and one of morality.  First, as a mat-
ter of law, my nondisclosure of confidential government-attorney information
                                                          
had Jones been named in 1990, and provoked a confirmation fight, who is to say that Bush would have
appointed Thomas in 1991?  He might well have appointed Souter.
25. See Paulsen, Book Review, supra note 23, at 225-33.
26. See Nomination of  David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 189 (1990).
PAULSEN.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  8:48 AM
Page 83: Winter 1998] GOV’T LAWYERS AND LOYALTY 95
was proper and obligatory.  To be sure, the controlling ethics rules seem fre-
quently to be honored in the breach, especially in Washington political circles.
That, however, does not vitiate the legal responsibility to obey the law.
Yet perhaps such widespread disregard bears on my second conclusion:  In
certain instances, one’s moral commitments must trump one’s obligation to
obey the law.  The bare fact of a legal obligation to remain silent does not mean
that I acted properly, in a moral sense, in remaining silent.  There are circum-
stances when silence equals death, and when adherence to role-obligations re-
sults in complicity with clear moral wrong, even if such complicity is expected
by the legal regime and non-compliance is likely to be futile, ineffective, and
punished.
The latter point is a theme of one of my earliest published writings on the
law, with specific reference to the issue of the law’s treatment of abortion.  My
thinking on this point has been influenced not only by religious conviction, but
also by the compelling work of one of my teachers and mentors in law school
(with whom I otherwise shared nothing but disagreements), the late Professor
Robert M. Cover of Yale Law School.  Cover’s book Justice Accused,27 con-
cerning the moral/formal dilemma confronting anti-slavery judges called on to
enforce pro-slavery law, was the subject of my 1989 review essay28 in the Jour-
nal of Law & Religion, in a symposium issue honoring Cover’s life.29  At about
the time of the Souter nomination, I had just completed that essay, which ar-
gued that a pro-life judge should resign or endure impeachment rather than
apply Roe v. Wade against conscience and against the Constitution.  I noted
that few judges probably had the fortitude to take such a stand.  It is a sad irony
that I failed to take action consistent with such a stance, when an arguably
analogous situation arose in my capacity as government attorney.
What of the other lawyers in the Bush Administration?  Is my argument
here on attack on them, too?  In part, yes, but it is mostly a reflection on differ-
ent perceptions of duty and loyalty, of cause and responsibility, and of what is
or is not a moral imperative.
President Bush, I believe, was pro-life but not strongly committed to such a
position.  It was more important to Bush not to ask—and thus not to know—
about a potential nominee’s position, because of process concerns about the in-
dependence of the judiciary30 and because of political concerns about con-
firmability and plausible deniability (no matter which way the nominee voted
                                                          
27. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
28. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M.
Cover’s JUSTICE ACCUSED, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33 (1989).
29. See Symposium, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1989).
30. In other writing, I have criticized the view that the notion of an “independent judiciary” coun-
sels against, or prohibits, inquiry into a prospective judicial appointee’s judicial philosophy or opinion
about prior cases.  As long as a prospective judge is not asked to, and does not, commit himself or her-
self to voting in a particular manner on a particular case or a particular issue, there is no interference
with the constitutional independence of the judiciary.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening out
THE CONFIRMATION MESS, 105 YALE L.J. 549 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN CARTER, THE CON-
FIRMATION MESS (1994)).
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on Roe).  Bush wanted a no-fingerprints, generic, nondescript “conservative”
jurist, and that is what he got.  There was a large risk that such a jurist would
not vote to overrule Roe v. Wade, but on this issue presidential deniability was
more important than judicial reliability.  Thus, in presenting the choice of
Souter to the President, Bush’s most senior legal advisers probably served him
faithfully.
Still, there were others, less high in the hierarchy but still important to the
decisionmaking process, who strongly subscribed to the Administration’s un-
stated commitment to appointing judges who would likely vote to overturn Roe
v. Wade, and who could be expected to be strong textualist/originalist jurists.
Among this group, there were some who, in my view, either incompetently did
not recognize the red flags about Souter, who foolishly ignored them, or who
deliberately disregarded them out of a desire to go along with the perceived
wishes of their superiors.  As far as I know (though I do not pretend to possess
anything near full knowledge on this point), no one in a position to persuade
the President argued vigorously against the nomination of David Souter on the
ground that Souter’s apparent judicial philosophy and prior record as a New
Hampshire Supreme Court justice made him unacceptable—even though I am
convinced that several critical persons within the Justice Department and
White House were strongly committed to the appointment of true judicial con-
servatives and recognized the evidence that Souter was not such a candidate.
For these persons, it would have been no violation of the duty of loyalty to
press the case against Souter within the Administration.  It might have posed
some risk to career advancement, but loyalty does not require sycophancy.  In
the end, however, even these persons might simply have been unsure.  At least
they were not sure enough of their concerns about Souter to argue more
strenuously against him, in opposition to powerful political advisers and pa-
trons within the White House who appeared strongly to favor Souter.
III
WAG THE LAWYERS?31: WHERE LOYALTY LIES
I wonder—I have no first-hand knowledge—if something similar might
have occurred (or be occurring today) among government lawyers serving in
the upper echelons of the Clinton Administration, in the White House and in
the Department of Justice, who quite likely have had knowledge of probable
illegal conduct by high officials within the Administration, including President
Clinton himself.  The situation of Clinton’s government lawyers is in many ways
the reverse of the Souter situation:  The law governing the lawyers’ conduct in
the Clinton case appears to require disclosure of otherwise confidential infor-
mation concerning government officials’ actions, whereas the law governing my
                                                          
31. Cf. WAG THE DOG (New Line Cinema 1998).  Wag The Dog is a fictional film, predating the
public revelation of the Monica Lewinsky affair by only a matter of weeks, in which the President’s
“fixers” seek to divert the public’s attention from the President’s molestation of a teenager by staging
a fake war in Albania.
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conduct forbade disclosure of government officials’ contemplated actions.  But,
in certain respects, the basic matrix of questions, the likely influences on gov-
ernment lawyers’ actual behavior, the possibility of a “conscientious objection”
to one’s legal duty under the circumstances, and the central question of where
loyalty lies are remarkably similar.
I assume for the sake of argument what appears as of the date of this writ-
ing (late summer 1998) most probably to be the case:  President Clinton, and
perhaps others within and without the government acting with President Clin-
ton’s knowledge and support, conspired to give and did give false sworn testi-
mony in a federal judicial proceeding, in felony violation of several provisions
of the U.S. Code, and then took steps to delay and prevent such violations from
being discovered and prosecuted.  I further assume that it is at least likely
(given the vigorous resistance to subpoenas by such persons) that government
lawyers—especially those in the Office of Counsel to the President—possessed
for some time (and continue to possess) knowledge of probable criminal con-
duct, some completed and some arguably ongoing, by the President and his as-
sociates.
What, then, explains the failure of these government lawyers to disclose
such information to the appropriate public official (normally, the Attorney
General; here, the Independent Counsel authorized to investigate these matters
on behalf of the United States), or to Congress or the public?  Is it a perception
that the lawyer’s true ethical duty is to keep such information confidential?  Is
it a mistaken understanding of who the government lawyer’s “client” is?  Is it a
belief that some moral imperative requires the lawyer to maintain confidenti-
ality, in order to prevent political damage to President Clinton, even if the law’s
requirements are to the contrary?  Do key lawyers in the Department of Justice
or the White House Counsel’s office believe that the moral imperative of main-
taining Bill Clinton in office and of avoiding embarrassments to his Admini-
stration, or of resisting what they believe to be a malicious prosecution, trumps
their obligation to obey the law and to adhere to the ethical responsibilities of
an attorney?
There appear to be four basic possibilities (with variations within each cate-
gory).  The first three are possible “dodges,” but each has serious analytical
flaws.  The fourth frames the basic question of the limits of an executive branch
lawyer’s loyalty to the incumbent administration, where what is involved is not
a policy disagreement (as was the case with my dilemma concerning the Souter
nomination) but a question of the violation and evasion of the law by powerful
officials within the administration.
The first possibility is that an administration lawyer simply might not have
knowledge of any facts concerning criminal conduct by government officials.
While this unquestionably describes a large number of administration lawyers,
there doubtless are some who knew or should have known enough facts to draw
inferences of likely criminal conduct.  Pretended or contrived ignorance—
deliberately closing one’s eyes to facts one has a duty to see—does not count as
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lack of knowledge.  To the contrary, it is a violation of an in-house lawyer’s du-
ties to the entity she represents, in this case the U.S. government.  A see-no-
evil, “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” posture does not shield a government lawyer from
her ethical responsibilities on the theory that she does not “know” of law viola-
tions.32
The second possibility, as incredible as it might sound, is that the govern-
ment lawyer might not know what her ethical and legal responsibilities are or
might misunderstand who her client is.  The governing law on this point is quite
clear, however: The lawyer’s client is the government, not any individual of-
ficeholder, and the duty of loyalty therefore requires the government lawyer to
disclose his knowledge of criminal acts by other government officials or em-
ployees to the highest authority authorized to act on behalf of the government,
which is the Attorney General (or an Independent Counsel, where the matter
falls within an Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction).  Further (but more prob-
lematic), the lawyer may also have a duty to make such information public if
the Attorney General or Independent Counsel insists upon action on behalf of
the United States, including a refusal to act, that constitutes a clear violation of
law.33
The affirmative duty of government lawyers to report suspected violations
of the federal criminal code by other federal officials is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
535(b), and extends to any “information, allegation, or complaint” received by
any department or agency of the Executive Branch “relating to” known viola-
tions of title 18 of the U.S. Code “involving government officers and employ-
ees.”  The report is to be made to the Attorney General, unless “the responsi-
bility to perform an investigation with respect thereto is specifically assigned
                                                          
32. “Knowledge” here is used in the same sense in which attorney ethics rules and cases applying
criminal and regulatory law employ the term:  “Knowledge” denotes actual knowledge, but such
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.  It is well-established in the law of lawyering that a
lawyer acting as a legal counselor may not escape criminal or civil liability, or ethical responsibility, by
deliberately turning a blind eye to facts she has a duty to see.  Nor may an attorney remain silent about
known unlawful conduct where there exists a duty to speak, without becoming complicit in or assisting
the illegality.  See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.2(d) (1983); see also United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978); In re Am. Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D.
Ariz. 1992).
The attentive reader may have noted that I have shifted to the pronoun “she” in this paragraph.
The shift is only partly stylistic.  The failure of Attorney General Janet Reno, the highest-ranking legal
official and adviser in the Executive Branch of the United States government, to press President Clin-
ton and others for full disclosure of facts, her silence in the face of powerful evidence of criminal
wrongdoing within the Administration, and her willingness to be used as a pawn in resisting disclosure
of these facts to the Independent Counsel (or to her), marks a shameful dereliction of duty on her part.
Attorney General Reno is the archetype of the corporate in-house counsel who looks the other way as
corporate officials violate the law, and who through studied inaction arguably has assisted such offi-
cials in their attempts to prevent disclosure of their wrongdoing.
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983) (setting forth principles for
the representation of organizational clients in general).
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otherwise by another provision of law,” the most obvious example being an In-
dependent Counsel investigation.34
Even in the absence of this statute, the ethics rules that apply to all lawyers
require the same result.35  The situation of White House Counsel (and other
government lawyers) is directly analogous to that of in-house counsel for a cor-
poration.  The lawyer represents the entity, not present management of the en-
tity.  This is so even though the lawyer may owe her position to present man-
agement and feel a sense of personal loyalty to the CEO or to certain members
of the board of directors.  To be sure, an organizational client (like the gov-
ernment) operates through its duly constituted management, and, as noted
above, lawyers for organizations are expected to represent and further the
(lawful) policies of present management, and to keep its confidences.  But the
in-house lawyer has an affirmative duty to the corporation (here, “USA, Inc.”)
not to remain silent about violations of law by corporate officials that breach
the officer’s duty to the corporation and that are likely to result in substantial
injury to its interests.36
In this context, where federal officials likely have violated federal law, the
officials’ breach of a duty to the entity (“USA, Inc.”) is established by the fact
of the violation of the laws of the entity (the U.S. Code).  Practically by defini-
tion, federal officials’ violations of federal criminal laws constitute a substantial
injury to the interests of the federal government.  (I address presently the ques-
tion of whether the law violations implicated by the Clinton affair involve no
substantial injury to the interests of the United States, on the theory that the
law violations were inconsequential.37)  Thus lawyer ethics rules, quite apart
from 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), require a government lawyer, at a minimum, to dis-
close information concerning the violation of federal law by federal officials to
the highest authority authorized to act on behalf of the entity—here, by statute,
                                                          
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994) (imposing reporting duty); 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994) (stating
that the Independent Counsel exercises the full power and responsibilities of the Attorney General in
matters that are within the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction).
35. The D.C. Circuit recently construed 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) as not applying to the Office of the
President.  See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(noting that the statute “does not clearly apply to the Office of the President” but also noting that the
Office of the President “has traditionally adhered” to the policy of the statute).
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).  That is not to say that an
organization, including the federal government, might not legitimately deem it an appropriate use of
the organization’s resources to pay for, or provide, legal representation to individual officers, to repre-
sent those individuals’ personal legal concerns that arise from their work in connection with the or-
ganization.  It is common, for example, for corporations to provide (separate) representation to direc-
tors or officers who are sued personally in connection with their activities as directors or officers, or to
provide reimbursement for legal expenses in unsuccessful derivative suits brought against them.  The
U.S. government has detailed regulations providing for representation (or reimbursement for legal ex-
penses) of government employees who are sued, subpoenaed, or charged in connection with conduct
taken in their capacity as government officers or employees.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15-.16 (1998).  At pre-
sent, however, it is clear that the relationship of White House Counsel to the Office of the President is
not one of attorney for the President personally, but for the Office of the President as part of the U.S.
government.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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the Attorney General or her authorized designee (such as the Independent
Counsel acting within the scope of his jurisdiction).38
Is it really possible that government lawyers at the highest levels of the U.S.
government do not understand this?  The analogy to corporate counsel is so
clear, and the command of 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) so basic, that one would expect
that lawyers of a caliber to be considered for such important posts as senior po-
sitions in the Office of Counsel to the President or in the Department of Justice
would know or be expected very quickly to learn the basics of the attorney-
client relationship that govern their roles.
Nonetheless, my experience and observation, both while in the government
and as an outside observer, suggest that it is indeed possible that some execu-
tive branch lawyers either do not know the law that governs their conduct or
“know” it only in the abstract and have not internalized its standards into their
own behavior.  The positions of Counsel to the President and of Attorney Gen-
eral, and many subordinate posts in the White House Counsel’s office and the
Justice Department, are fundamentally political posts, in addition to being legal
positions.  While some men and women holding these positions are terrific law-
yers, they are typically not selected for their knowledge of legal ethics, or even
for their technical legal skills generally, but for other attributes deemed impor-
tant by the President.  Persons holding such political/legal positions within the
Executive Branch operate within a work environment and ethical milieu in
which political loyalty is valued highly and in which scrupulous attachment to
legal ethics, in a manner that challenges the conduct of others within the ad-
ministration, may be viewed at best with irritation (though perhaps grudging
acceptance) and at worst as a symptom of political disloyalty.
In addition, “Counsel to the President” is an especially heady and poten-
tially misleading label.  The Counsel to the President is not counsel to the
President personally in his personal capacity, but a government lawyer whose
duties run to the U.S. government.  The title “Counsel to the President” de-
scribes that office’s area of job responsibilities—its portfolio—and that portfo-
lio is much more comprehensive and significant than any other legal office
within the government (save for Attorney General and perhaps a few other po-
sitions in the Department of Justice).  Yet “Counsel to the President” is still a
law office within the government of the United States.  Nonetheless, it is obvi-
ously true that many persons who have held this job title in recent years have
viewed their “client” as the President, as CEO of the United States; that is, they
incorrectly view themselves as representing the officer, rather than the office,
                                                          
38. Constitutionally, the President is the highest official of the Executive Branch.  Therefore, 28
U.S.C. § 535(b) should be understood as making the Attorney General the President’s designee for
these purposes, always subject to the President’s direction and control.  This structure presents a diffi-
culty when the President is one of the persons whose conduct potentially violates the law.  In such an
event, § 535(b) operates as a mechanism for informing the Attorney General of possible presidential
illegality and commits to that officer the responsibility of representing the interests of USA, Inc., in
assuring that government officers conduct themselves in conformity with the law.
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and ignore or forget that the President’s conduct, and that of other executive
branch officials, must also conform to the laws of the United States.
Thus, though it is somewhat embarrassing to say it, it is quite likely the case
that a good many lawyers operating at the highest levels of the U.S. govern-
ment do not know for whom they work or what legal and ethical duties govern
their work relationships, and they do not care to learn.  They have a mistaken
sense of loyalty because they have a mistaken understanding of, or little regard
for, the law that governs their own conduct. 39
This brings us to the third possible reason for the failure of government
lawyers to disclose violations of federal law—where the lawyer knows of unlaw-
ful conduct, understands the content of his ethical duties, but judges the unlaw-
ful conduct to be insubstantial and thus concludes that there exists no legal ob-
ligation to disclose it.  This quite possibly describes the views (or at least the
public posture) of some highly placed lawyers in the Clinton Administration.
The problem with this view is that the role of evaluating the significance of the
law violation is assigned to the Attorney General (or Independent Counsel).
As a legal matter, it is not for the government lawyer, in the White House or
elsewhere, to judge, even in good faith, that the law violation at issue is not ma-
terial, not substantial, not important, or not worth the damage to the President
or his administration.  The government lawyer—other than the Attorney Gen-
eral or an Independent Counsel—is a mere subordinate, without authority to
substitute his or her judgment for that of the duly constituted authority within
the government.
Finally, there is the intriguing and somewhat disturbing fourth possibility—
namely, that the government lawyer believes that, notwithstanding knowledge
of the facts and the law governing his conduct, he should remain silent about
possible criminal wrongdoing by other federal officials because he believes that
some other, superior moral principle should lead him to violate the law and his
ethical duties as an attorney.  In the Clinton Administration, specifically, have
government lawyers who know about illegal conduct, and know of their legal
and ethical duty to disclose information to the Attorney General or Independ-
ent Counsel concerning such conduct, deliberately violated the law out of a
sense that some higher ethical or moral duty requires them to protect the Ad-
ministration, or President Clinton personally, from political damage?
                                                          
39. Indeed, only such a fundamental misconception concerning the role of a government attorney
can explain the apparent belief of lawyers in the Clinton Administration that government lawyers in
the White House Counsel’s office may invoke attorney-client privilege to attempt to prevent disclosure
to the Office of Independent Counsel (exercising the powers of the Attorney General in this matter) of
communications between government lawyers and the President relevant to an investigation of possi-
ble criminal activity in which federal officials may be involved.  As this article goes to press, two cir-
cuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have emphatically rejected such claims of privilege.  See In re
Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).  For a fuller discussion, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who
“Owns” the Government’s Attorney-Client Privilege? MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
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One could imagine circumstances in which a national crisis, foreign or do-
mestic, or some overriding policy imperative leads a government official
(including a government lawyer) knowingly to violate the law in order to pre-
serve the President’s political power or an Administration policy.  This seems
to have been the ethical stance of many within the upper echelons of the Nixon
Administration, when Watergate was raging:  War (both Vietnam and the Cold
War), domestic violence, vigorous resistance to Administration policies—
enemies abroad and “enemies” at home—along with the large number of for-
eign crises in the world, apparently led some of “the President’s men” to con-
clude that President Nixon needed to remain in office, no matter what.
It is harder to believe that a similar calculation is at work with government
lawyers in the Clinton Administration.  No great, immediate national crisis cur-
rently besets the United States.  The nation is at peace.  The Cold War is over.
The economy is strong.  Domestic tranquility prevails.  To be sure, the world
remains a dangerous place and foreign affairs constantly require vigorous and
immediate attention.40  Yet there is no extraordinary circumstance that is even
believably available as an asserted reason for preserving the President’s politi-
cal power or an Administration policy at all costs.
One could imagine—it is easy for me to imagine—a government lawyer
feeling so strongly about some issue of policy (like abortion) that he is willing
to violate his legal and ethical duties in order to further it.  One could even
imagine a lawyer acting in complicity with the illegal conduct of others, in order
to advance (or preserve) a deeply felt policy imperative.41  Again, however, it is
difficult to imagine what such policies might be with respect to the Clinton
Administration.42
                                                          
40. A notorious example is the August 1998 terrorist bombing of two American embassies in Af-
rica, causing hundreds of deaths.  President Clinton responded by ordering (within days of his personal
appearance before a federal grand jury to address allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice) re-
taliatory bombings of suspected terrorist bases and support networks in Afghanistan and Sudan.
It is possible that a government lawyer, aware of such events, might be reluctant to disclose infor-
mation that would expose the President of the United States or other high administration officials to
charges of violation of federal criminal law.  But the basic facts concerning President Clinton’s in-
volvement in probable crimes were available to key government lawyers for many months before the
embassy bombings.  Crisis could at most excuse delay in making disclosure, but it does not obviate a
government lawyer’s legal and ethical duties entirely.
41. Such a moral posture appears to have been taken by at least some of the principal players in
the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan Administration.  With respect to some individuals, there may
have existed sound arguments that their conduct did not in fact violate any law, or at most constituted
a technical violation of non-criminal prohibitions on particular uses of appropriated funds.  However,
there appears to have been substantial evidence that some other individuals knowingly presented false,
sworn testimony to other branches of government, in order to keep secret from Congress an “off-the-
books” covert operation deemed by the persons involved to be vital to the interests of the United
States.  To the extent attorneys knew of such conduct (or were personally involved), the analysis in the
text would apply to their conduct as well.
42. The most likely domestic issue of this sort is, oddly enough, abortion—though from the oppo-
site perspective of the one I held while serving in the Bush Administration.  About the only major do-
mestic policy issue on which President Clinton has proved to be consistently committed during his ten-
ure in office is his uncompromising support of abortion-on-demand.  Some persons, holding legal and
moral views the opposite of my own, believe that maintenance of unrestricted legal abortion is a high
moral imperative.  Perhaps such persons, perceiving an ethical conflict that is the mirror image of the
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It is more probable that some Clinton Administration lawyers sense a
rather different form of moral/legal conflict.  If one assumes that the Admini-
stration’s attacks on Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation are
something more than cynical (that is, are more than tactical attempts to thwart
Starr’s investigation and prevent the truth from being disclosed), but proceed
from the sincere belief that Starr’s investigation was itself an abuse of power
with improper partisan motives, then a government lawyer legitimately might
feel a moral obligation to resist illegitimate attacks on the President by such an
evil prosecutor.  While I do not share this view on the merits,43 I understand
that some persons might sincerely hold this view.  For such persons, the
moral/legal dilemma they perceive is akin to the one I felt with respect to the
Souter appointment:  There is a moral duty to resist a clear-and-present evil
(abortion; an evil prosecutor), and there is a legal duty inconsistent with one’s
perception of where the moral imperative lies in the particular situation
(confidentiality; disclosure of evidence in a criminal investigation).
Resolving such a conflict is one of the most difficult problems a government
lawyer (or any lawyer, for that matter) can face, and the difficulty cuts across
partisan affiliations.  If one accepts that moral duties can sometimes trump le-
gal/ethical obligations, then leaking information about Souter or resisting dis-
closure of evidence to Starr stand, in principle, on the same moral ground.
Reasonable people can and do disagree about whether the moral values moti-
vating the attorney are correct in each case, about the weight to be accorded
such moral values when compared to the competing moral values embodied in
the legal rule to be violated, and about whether the facts support the invocation
of the asserted moral belief in the case at hand.  Is overruling Roe a compelling
moral objective or a bad one?  Does the goal of overruling Roe justify disclo-
sure of confidences concerning the lawful policy intentions of the President one
serves?  Is defeating David Souter really the key to reversing Roe (and would
that really stop legal abortion)?  Is Starr’s investigation truly evil or are such
assertions in fact rationalizations or themselves an attempt to obstruct justice?
                                                          
one I had, believe that President Clinton’s support for abortion rights justifies acquiescence in unlawful
obstruction of justice as a regrettable but necessary lesser evil.  Given the intensity of the commitment
that exists on the part of both strong pro-lifers and strong advocates of abortion rights, it is not uni-
maginable that this might explain some Clinton Administration lawyers’ (and others’) tolerance of
unlawful conduct that they otherwise would condemn if performed by persons not sharing their politi-
cal agenda.
43. I think the attacks on Starr are cynical and tactical.  Though politically difficult, it lies within
the power of the Administration, acting through the Attorney General, to fire an Independent Counsel
if the Administration believes justifiable cause exists to do so (which would certainly include evidence
that an Independent Counsel’s investigation is politically motivated or constitutes an abuse of power
on the Independent Counsel’s part).  See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).  While the Independent Coun-
sel could seek judicial review of his discharge, see id. § 596(a)(3), presumably any evidence of miscon-
duct by the Independent Counsel would compel the judicial conclusion that the discharge must be sus-
tained as a matter of law.  The Clinton Administration has been aggressive, though largely
unsuccessful, in pressing legal challenges against Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.  It would seem
that the question of disobedience to one’s legal/ethical duties, on the ground that it is morally impera-
tive to resist an evil prosecutor, only becomes ripe when the legal channels for discharging such a
prosecutor—channels clearly open to the upper echelon of Administration lawyers, but for political
concerns—have been exhausted.
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Unless one is prepared to say that moral considerations never trump legal obli-
gations, then, depending on the facts and the true motives of the persons in-
volved, leaking Souter and covering for Clinton might occupy the same moral
ground.  At the very least, they contest for the same ground.
It is more likely, I think, that the refusal by the most knowledgeable and
powerful government lawyers in the Clinton Administration to reveal informa-
tion concerning President Clinton’s possible criminal wrongdoing is motivated
not by policy concerns (like abortion or antiterrorism) or by a genuine, sup-
portable belief that the Independent Counsel’s investigation represents a moral
evil that justifies violation of one’s legal duties, but by simple personal loyalty
to Bill Clinton.  In other words, the government lawyer has concluded he will
violate the law not because some independent moral principle requires it, but
simply to advance the personal interests of individual lawbreakers within the
Administration to whom he feels personally loyal.  To be sure, personal loyalty
to others is a moral principle in its own right, but it is not usually recognized as
one of sufficient weight to justify cooperation in the moral and legal wrongs of
others.  The technical term for government lawyers who take such a stance is
“co-conspirators.”  Sadly, it is possible that this describes some lawyers in the
Clinton Administration.  Such a position, I think, cannot be justified in moral
terms on the known facts about the Clinton situation, and it certainly cannot be
justified in legal terms.
IV
CONCLUSION: INERTIA AND ETHICS
Midpoints and mixtures of course exist within all of these categories, mak-
ing ethical dilemmas often very difficult to sort out for the government lawyer.
Knowledge of key facts may be incomplete.  Understanding of the law govern-
ing the government lawyers’ conduct may be incomplete or uncertain, and
might be contradicted by the apparent opinion or conduct of other lawyers in
the administration, including superiors.  The professional environment within
which the government lawyer works may not be conducive to patient ethical re-
flection and deliberation, or be unsupportive of questioning in this regard.  The
lawyer may feel isolated in his ethical qualms and may not have readily avail-
able other attorneys, not otherwise implicated in the matter, with whom to con-
sult for a detached “second opinion.”44
                                                          
44. How does a government lawyer ask anyone except outside, private counsel whether his or her
conduct is legal and ethical?  Another government lawyer, even a designated agency ethics official,
represents the government, and would have an obligation to disclose the underlying factual informa-
tion about possible criminal wrongdoing—and almost certainly the inquiring lawyer’s inquiry as well—
to the Attorney General.  The outside counsel route is the only one available.  (It is quite possible that
this exact dilemma is what led former Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster, Jr. to seek private
legal advice shortly before his suicide.)  Even that route may be problematic, if the matter in question
is one on which the lawyer arguably is forbidden to communicate with persons outside the government,
is highly classified, or is one in which sensitive or expert knowledge is required of the outside, non-
governmental attorney and few persons are readily available who are qualified to provide the type of
expert ethics advice.
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In addition, the lawyer may feel uncertain about where the moral impera-
tive lies in a given situation.  The lawyer may hold political beliefs supportive of
the administration, and feel a sense of personal loyalty to personnel within it.
Conversely, the lawyer may suspect the motivations or good faith of the person
to whom the legal duty of loyalty runs.  Finally, the lawyer may be worried
about his personal self-interest:  Most government lawyers are not independ-
ently wealthy.  The chief “capital” they possess is in the form of their law de-
grees, licenses, resumes, and professional reputation.  All of that capital is put
at risk when a government lawyer takes action contrary to the desires of the
persons who have hired him.  Rightly or wrongly, the ethos of silence runs deep
in the legal profession.  Violation of that norm, even for legitimate legal or
moral reasons, creates risks that many government lawyers are not comfortably
in a position to take.
All of this may cause even ethically sensitive lawyers to hesitate.  Uncer-
tainty, moral confusion, cowardice, or some mixture of these, lead to indecision
and, consequently, to inaction.  Why was it so hard for me to violate the duty
not to disclose the impending Souter nomination, even when I thought there
were morally compelling reasons to do so?  And why has it seemingly been so
easy for attorneys in the Clinton Administration (apparently) to violate the
duty to disclose information about unlawful conduct?  In both situations, iner-
tia favors silence and inaction, and many of the above factors can contribute to
inertia.  It is always easier not to act than to act, especially when affirmative ac-
tion creates personal risks and must be taken in the presence of incomplete in-
formation or uncertainty about the correctness of such a course of conduct.
Inertia pointed in opposite directions in the two situations discussed in this
essay.  In the Souter scenario, inertia weighed in favor of compliance with my
legal ethics duty (and against my own moral sense).  In the case of Clinton
Administration attorneys, inertia may have weighed in favor of noncompliance
with legal ethics duties.
In addition, personal loyalties to the President, to the Administration, or to
particular individuals within the government—the real world of people and
their inevitable influence over, and sometimes distortion of, ethical reasoning—
favored nondisclosure and inaction in both situations.  Personal loyalties also
pointed in opposite directions in the two different situations.  For me, “loyalty”
in this sense meant deferring to the views of others whom I respected, against
my own judgment, as I was required to do by the law.  For administration law-
yers in 1998, “loyalty” quite possibly has meant violation of ethical rules and
complicity in criminal conduct, out of respect for, deference toward, or friend-
ship with, the Administration officials who likely have engaged in such conduct.
In both cases, however, such loyalty was misguided.  A government lawyer’s
duty of loyalty to the administration in which he serves necessarily has both le-
gal and moral limits—legal limits lest the lawyer become an accomplice in
wrongdoing prohibited by law, and moral limits lest the lawyer become an ac-
complice in wrongdoing protected by law.  The legal lines are usually clearer
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than the moral ones (or, at least, less subject to honest disagreement), and am-
biguities obviously exist in both categories.  But lines exist.  An attorney for the
United States unquestionably owes a duty of loyalty to the administration
within which he or she serves.  But when that administration wants to take the
country “to hell in a handbasket,” legally or illegally, there are some circum-
stances in which the government attorney simply must not be a compliant
handmaiden.
